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Abstract This study investigates the pattern of prices for multiple
partnerships sold in the secondary market. In the model, the
partnership buyer prefers to purchase the units sequentially since
sellers have varying desires to sell. The beneﬁt of a sequential
purchase strategy is partially offset by rational sellers who
demand higher prices in earlier sales since the possibility of
future sales reduces the sellers’ eagerness to sell in earlier
rounds. If this strategic component is sufﬁciently large, a pattern
of decreasing prices should be observed. Using a panel dataset
comprised of 52,679 transactions from eighteen real estate
limited partnerships, and after controlling for performance
characteristics, the study ﬁnds that prices decrease over time,
thus indicating a signiﬁcant strategic component in this market.
Introduction
Syndicated limited partnerships (LPs) provide an accessible and uncomplicated
way for middle to upper income investors to enjoy co-ownership of asset pools.
Typically limited partners purchase claims to future returns of assets acquired by
the general partner who manages the assets day-to-day and represents investors’
ﬁduciary interests. Limited partners favor such an arrangement since their
liabilities are limited to the amount of their capital investments, and cash ﬂow
distributions are prioritized to guarantee their initial investments and a promised
return before the general partner is compensated. The success of this structure has
resulted in $132 billion worth of LPs investing in real estate ($69 billion), oil and
gas ($32.3 billion), leasing equipment ($7.2 billion), cable television ($1.9 billion)
and other miscellaneous areas. By design LPs are illiquid investments with long
holding periods.
In 1980, Liquidity Fund initiated a program of buying LPs and effectively creating
a secondary market to provide liquidity. The number of ﬁrms that buy and sell
LPs has since grown; many of them purchasing partnerships to form investment
funds exclusively comprised of seasoned LPs have survived the earliest and often
the riskiest part of their economic life. Furthermore, in contrast to new
partnerships, these LPs provide historical performance records thus allowing216  Quan and Xuan
investors to better assess future performance. These investments also have a
shorter holding period and, depending on the structure, can yield tax beneﬁts for
certain investors.
A critical task facing ﬁrms that trade in this secondary market is determining an
LP’s purchase price because the difference between the resale and acquisition price
determines proﬁts. Pricing involves determining of the so-called ‘‘break-up’’value,
an estimate of the partnership’s instantaneous asset liquidation value less liabilities
and the general partner’s compensation. It is not uncommon for LPs to be
purchased at 20% of the break-up value, representing an 80% discount. In this
study, the total average discount was 30%.1 This discount appears to vary
considerably, depending on whether the purchases were made in the earlier or the
later rounds of purchases. The average discount ranges from 23% to 43%:
This study proposes a strategic model of how these discounts are determined and
investigates their pattern when LPs from the same partnership are purchased over
time. The model recognizes that a limited partner’s decision to sell at a particular
price is similar to the task facing bidders in a common value multiple-object
sealed-bid auction. Several distinguishing features of this market motivate the
modeling approach.
First, limited partners are often uninformed about the true value of their claim on
assets. Although general partners provide periodic reports on asset performance,
these estimates are often overly optimistic. In particular, for real estate LPs, there
is considerable uncertainty about the value of the underlying real estate, and
estimates are often based on imprecise appraisals. Even if a reasonable asset value
is available, limited partners cannot determine their partnership stakes without
detailed information about the general partner’s compensation and all other
liabilities.
Second, prices will likely reﬂect strategic behavior among competing sellers
because the number of purchased units is often small relative to the total number
of LPs outstanding. Buyers often only want to acquire a limited number of units
from any given partnership.
When purchased simultaneously, multiple LPs must be purchased at the same
price. Given that limited partners are uninformed about the value of their
partnership, buyers may wish to price discriminate by purchasing multiple LPs
sequentially, thus establishing a pattern of increasing prices, or decreasing
discounts. However, by anticipating a sequential purchasing strategy, sellers may
demand higher prices in the early rounds as they wait to sell in the later rounds.
This suggests that prices may fall over time as more units are sold. Whether a
pattern of increasing or decreasing discounts emerges depends largely on which
effect dominates. The strength of each effect largely depends on the sellers’private
signals and perhaps in the number of outstanding LPs.
To empirically detect a pattern of discounts, a trade-level panel database that
records sequential purchases made over time was used. The sample is comprisedPricing Limited Partnerships  217
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of 2,424 transactions involving 52,679 individual LPs. After controlling for each
partnership’s performance, the analysis reveals a strong pattern of decreasing
discounts.
Next, the trading process and how the purchasing ﬁrm solicits the limited partners
is described.2 The model and empirical results follow.
 The Trading Process and Strategic Considerations
The trading process is initiated when the acquiring ﬁrm performs a preliminary
analysis on all existing LPs to identify subgroups that own desirable and
performing assets. A letter sent to each limited partner within each sub-group
solicits sellers. No prices are quoted at this stage. Upon receiving a sufﬁcient
number of positive responses from a given partnership, the acquiring ﬁrm
determines the partnership’s break-up value and each limited partner’s share.
Because partnership structures differ in the cash distribution between the limited
and general partners, information must be obtained from either the general partner
or from 10K reports that partnerships are required to ﬁle.
The break-up value is comprised of the acquiring ﬁrm’s appraisal of the
partnership’s real estate holdings less liabilities. This value corresponds to the sum
payable to the limited partners in accordance with the priorities set forth in the
partnership agreement. The ﬁnal offer price is determined to be a fraction of this
break-up value. This process of determining the offer price typically takes two to
three weeks.
The ﬁrm must also determine the method of buying the desired number of units.
Where simultaneous multiple purchases are involved, ﬁrms are required to
purchase all units at the same price. A sequential purchase strategy will allow
them to pay different prices for each purchase and the ﬁrm must determine a
schedule of prices that they are willing to pay for the number of units they wish
to purchase.
The most common motive for selling is investors’ dissatisfaction with the
underlying assets’ performance (Wollack and Donaldson, 1992). This
dissatisfaction combined with the observation that most limited partners are unsure
of the value of their partnerships suggests that their selling decisions depend
crucially on their information sets. And since each limited partner has equal claims
on the underlying assets, it appears natural to model each limited partnership as
having some common value.
Conceptually, the limited partners submit ‘‘bids’’ to sell their LPs to the buyer,
and because all partnership claims are identical, the partner willing to sell for the
lowest price ‘‘wins.’’ Each limited partner must determine a selling price based
on incomplete information about the partnerships’ common value. Thus, the risk
neutral bidder’s task is to determine a selling price that would maximize expected218  Quan and Xuan
proﬁts, deﬁned as the product of the probability of selling (or the probability their
selling price is one of the lowest) and their asking price.
The purchase of multiple LPs from competing sellers introduces another
dimension to our auction. Since the simultaneous purchase of multiple
partnerships must be made at the same price, a buyer may price discriminate and
purchase the number of desired units sequentially, paying lower prices to buyers
with low signals in earlier rounds and paying higher prices in later rounds. The
proﬁtability of this strategy is partially offset by sellers who may set high prices
in earlier rounds and sell in later ones if necessary. With such strategies, prices
would fall over time as more units are sold. The possibility of later sales works
to the buyer’s disadvantage, thus, the buyer is discouraged from disclosing the
number of units to be purchased. On the other hand, the limited partners recognize
that the intention of the buyer may not be truthfully disclosed and, therefore,
assumes the buyer may purchase more units than initially announced.
 Partnership Pricing Model
In the model, all agents are risk neutral and discounting is ignored.3 Learning is
also ignored. For uninformed sellers, observation of previous sales has
considerable informational value for the remaining partners and, therefore, will
affect their subsequent selling decisions. Although this raises interesting issues,
notably the possibility that the buyer may use this mechanism to negotiate prices
in earlier sales to inﬂuence later sales, this element is suppressed in the model.
Furthermore, since LP units are not traded in a centralized exchange, no
mechanism exists whereby such information can be conveyed to the remaining
limited partners.4
Simultaneous Purchase
First consider a partner’s selling price given that an external buyer credibly
communicates that his wish to buy one such partnership. There are n partners
each holding an equal interest in an asset with a common value v.5 Let P(xi)b e
the price partner i is willing to sell given the signal xi for i  1 ,2 ,... ,n. P(.)
is an increasing function of the signal.6 The signal can be interpreted as the limited
partner’s estimate of v. F(xiv) represents the conditional distribution of the ith
partner’s estimate conditional on v. (vxi) is the conditional posterior density of
v given the partner i’s signal. F(.) is common knowledge.
A buyer wishes to purchase one out of n LP units. Let the subsequent market
valuation of the partnership be the common value v.7 The payoff to a risk neutral
limited partner who decides to sell at P is P  v. Because P(.) is an increasing
function of the partner signal x, the probability that P is lower than all other
partners is equivalent to the probability that the partner has the lowest signal.
Thus, the partner’s expected proﬁt from selling at P is P  v times the probabilityPricing Limited Partnerships  219
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that the partner has the lowest signal. Integrate over the distribution of v
conditional on private signal x, the limited partner’s problem is to determine P,
which maximizes the expected proﬁts given the distribution of signals and the
partner’s uncertainty about v.
1 n1 Max E []  (P  v)[1  F(P (x)v)] (vx)dv. (1)
Ideally i would like to sell for as much over v as possible. However, i is faced
with competition from the other n  1 partners. [1  F(P1(xi)v)] is the n1
probability that the other partners will not sell for less. If i asks too high a price,
other partners can ‘‘outbid’’ i. Thus the optimal selling price entails a surplus
bounded by the competitive actions of the other potential sellers.
By maximizing Equation (1) with respect to P and simplifying, a symmetric
equilibrium for P must satisfy the following differential equation:
n2  (n  1)(P  v)[1  F(xv)] ƒ(xv)(vx)dv
P(x)  . (2)
n1  [1  F(xv)] (vx)dv
Equation (2) does not have a closed-form solution and further simpliﬁcations are
required in order to solve for the equilibrium. A tractable solution can be obtained
if it is assumed, as in Levin and Smith (1991) and Thiel (1988), that (1) (v)i s
constant for all v or that the partners have diffuse priors, (2) estimation errors are
independent of the true value such that the conditional signal density function can
be expressed as an unconditional density and (3) each partner’s estimate of v is
unbiased or E[xi]  v. Under these assumptions, the problem can be expressed
as:
P(x)  KP (x)  K  Kx 0, where (3) 12 1

n(n  1) n22 K   [1  F(z)] ƒ(z) dz, (4) 1 


n22 K  n(n  1)  z[1  F(z)] ƒ(z) dz, (5) 2
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z  (x  v)/ the normalized signal, and  is its standard error.
For the general case when the buyer wishes to buy k units simultaneously at a
unit price, the differential Equation (3) is preserved but for this case:

(n  k  1)(n  k) nk12 K   [1  F(z)] ƒ(z) dz. (6) 1 


nk12 K  (n  k  1)(n  k)  z[1  F(z)] ƒ(z) dz. (7) 2

The general solution to the above problem is:
1  K2 P(x)  x   exp(Kx ). (8) 1 K1
where for signal distributions that are symmetric, (1  K2)/K1  0 and  is a
parameter that is deﬁned by an additional appropriate boundary condition. As
pointed out by Levin and Smith (1991), individual rationality requires   0. This
condition ensures that P(x) cannot be greater than x and rules out the possibility
that sellers have negative expected proﬁts. Wilson (1990) showed that if the signal
distribution is normal and that the priors are diffuse in the limit,   0 and the
symmetric equilibrium pricing strategy is linear. Assuming a uniform signal
distribution over the range, [v  ,  ], it can be shown that K1  (n  v
k  1)/2 and K2  (n  k  1)/2  1. Substituting these expressions into
Equation (8) produces the following closed-form solution for the symmetric Nash
equilibrium pricing schedule for k units:
x(n  k  1)
P(x)  x     exp . (9)  2
Because   0, P(x) is decreasing in n and increasing in k.F o rag i v e nk  n,
as the number of partners increase, the lower will be the equilibrium selling price.
Similarly, for a given n, the price paid for the purchase of k units will be lower
than the purchase price for k  1 unit. The more units desired, the more likely
that each will be chosen. Thus, partners will increase their selling prices
accordingly and, therefore, will reduce the discount.Pricing Limited Partnerships  221
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For normally distributed signals, when k  1, the symmetric equilibrium pricing
strategy is:
P(x)  x    exp(Kx ), (10) n 1
where:

 2 n  td [F(t)]  1 n   and K    td[F(t)] . (11) n 1  n  td[F(t)]  
and F(.) is the normal distribution function.8 The intuition from the above
expression comes from noting that n is convex in n; and P is therefore convex
in n. Intuitively, if the nonlinear term is ignored, the curvature of n implies that
selling prices will be higher for small n because a larger surplus will be demanded
by limited partners when they face less competition. As n increases, the surplus
is reduced as competition increases and lower selling prices result. However, if n
increases beyond the minimum point of n, the price will increase, which
corresponds to an adjustment for the likelihood of falling victim to the winner’s
curse. Since the likelihood of being victimized grows as the number of partners
increase, the rational seller must add on a premium to compensate for this
possibility.
Purchasing Sequentially or Simultaneously?
A buyer who wishes to purchase k LPs must determine not only the offer price
but also the best mechanism for the purchase; either sequentially or
simultaneously. Each mechanism will yield different proﬁts since the partners’
selling strategies will also differ.
If the number of units desired by the buyer is known and credibly communicated
to the sellers, the selling price will not be affected by sequential buying. However,
the buyer may consider announcing that only one unit will be purchased when,
in fact, the buyer wants more. With the possibility that the buyer may want more
than one unit, the optimal selling price for the initial sale will be set differently
due to the potential of a later sale. In the following model, conditions where such
a deceptive practice is optimal are determined and whether it will yield the buyer
higher proﬁts.
To demonstrate this effect, consider the case when the maximum number of units
a buyer is willing to purchase is two. First, consider the selling strategy when the
buyer wishes to buy only one unit. Let q be the probability that the buyer only222  Quan and Xuan
wants one and (1  q) that the buyer wants two. The probability that the buyer
is misleading is p.9 The probability the buyer wants one unit as disclosed is
q/(q  p(1  q)). Correspondingly, the probability that there will be an offer to
buy another unit is p(1  q)/[q  p(1  q)]. Disclosing the true number of units
desired is a buyer choice variable and conditions for are derived for truthful
disclosure. This is achieved by determining the Nash equilibrium corresponding
to the proposed sequential solicitation game. Each partner, conjecturing that the
buyer has a certain probability of buying in later rounds, determines the selling
price in the ﬁrst round and expected selling price in the second round if necessary.
Let be the equilibrium price the partner is willing to sell in the ﬁrst round after ˜ P
the buyer’s announcement. Conditional on p and q, the LPs’ expected surplus
function from such a case could be expressed as:
E[P  vk  1]
q n1   (P  v)[1  F(xv)] (vx)dv
q  p(1  q)
p(1  q) n1   (P  v)[1  F(xv)] (vx)dv  q  p(1  q)
n1 n2  (P  v)[1  (1  F(xv)) ][1  F(xv)] (vx)dv . 
(12)
If the buyer only wishes to buy one unit (q  1), the expected payoff for the
seller is the same as the one unit purchase case. This is represented by the ﬁrst
term in Equation (12). If, in actuality, the buyer wishes to buy two units
sequentially, then the ﬁrst part of the second term reﬂects the likelihood of a seller
selling in the ﬁrst round (or analogously having the lowest signal of the n
partners). The second part corresponds to the seller’s expected surplus in the
second round with the remaining n  1 partners, given an unsuccessful sale in
the ﬁrst round.
The Appendix shows that the solution to the partner’s optimization problem must
satisfy the following differential equation:
P(x)  KP (x)  K  Kx 0, (13) 12 1
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1 t(n  1) 2n42 K   [1  F(z)] ƒ(z) dz  1  1  tt

n 2(n  1)
(1  t)(n  1) n22   [1  F(z)] ƒ(z) dz

t(n  2) n1 n32   [1  (1  F(z) ][1  F(z)] ƒ(z) dz .  
(14)
and
1 t(n  1) 2n42 K   z[1  F(z)] ƒ(z) dz  2  1  tt

n 2(n  1)
(1  t)(n  1) n22   z[1  F(z)] ƒ(z) dz

t(n  2) n1 n32   z[1  (1  F(z)) ][1  F(z)] ƒ(z) dz .  
(15)
where: t  p(1  q)/q. The general solution is:
(1  K ) 2 ˜ P(x)  x   exp(Kx ). (16) 1 K1
Deﬁne as the seller’s price if there were n partners and the buyer wishes to n P2
purchase the maximum two units simultaneously. Let be the seller’s price in n ˜ P1
the ﬁrst round given that the buyer has announced that he wants one unit n ˜ P1
corresponds to a partner’s selling price in the ﬁrst round given that the buyer may
wish to purchase additional units in later rounds.
The buyer’s expected proﬁt function can be viewed as follows:
nn 1 n ˜ E[]  p[v  P  (v  P )]  (1  p) [2(v  P )]. (17) 11 2224  Quan and Xuan
the buyer decides to be misleading, v  will be received in the ﬁrst round of n ˜ Pn
solicitation among the n partners and (v  ) in the second round. Conversely, n1 P1
if the buyer decides to be truthful, then the decision will be to buy two units
resulting in a surplus of ). It is important to note that since nn n 1 ˜ 2(v  PP  P 21 1
sellers recognize that the buyer may be misleading in the ﬁrst round. The buyer’s
task is to maximize the expected proﬁt function with respect to p and determine
the method of purchasing multiple units. The following is in general true for a
p  0:
Proposition 1. If the signal distribution is uniform around v such that x  [v 
, v  ] and n  2(1  t)/t, then nn 1 ˜ P  P . 11
The n  2(1  t)/t requires that there are sufﬁcient numbers of limited partners
relative to the probabilities p and q.10
Note that:
n(n  1)(1  t) n ˜ ˜ P  x     exp x . (18)  1 [2(1  t)(n  1)  tn]
Also note that the price for a single partnership among n  1 partners is the same
as the price for purchasing two units among n partners, thus:
(n  1)x n1 n P  P  x     exp . (19)  12 2
Thus, the condition is satisﬁed if: nn 1 ˜ P  P 11
n(n  1)(1  t)( n  1)
 . (20)
[2(1  t)(n  1)  tn]2 
since   0. By substitution, 2(1  t)/t, which clearly holds. nn 1 ˜ P  P if n  11
is consistent with the intuition that the seller will ask for a higher price nn 1 ˜ P  P 11
in the ﬁrst round if there is a positive probability of selling in the second round.
The probability of selling in the second round decreases the cost of not selling in
the ﬁrst, thus, the seller will ask for a higher price in the ﬁrst round. The above
ordering also depends on the relative signals. The buyer beneﬁts from false
disclosure when prices of the two units differ; identical signals present no
incentive for false disclosure.Pricing Limited Partnerships  225
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The previous result gives rise to an empirical test. An implication of the above
ordering result is that prices will decrease over time when LPs are purchased
sequentially. This pattern arises because of the repeated game effect in the
analysis. In contrast, the absence of strategic considerations will result in a pattern
of increasing prices since those who are eager to sell will sell in earlier rounds at
low prices while those less eager will sell in later rounds at higher prices.
The model indicates that if future sales are possible, rational sellers would be
willing to ask for higher prices in earlier rounds, but as the number of units sold
increases or as the buyer’s purchases approaches a set limit, sellers would reduce
their asking prices thus yielding a pattern of decreasing prices. Since this
implication depends on the signal distribution that is unobservable, no formal test
of the above model is possible. However, the above ordering effect can be tested
if repeated sales of the same partnership units over time can be observed.
 Empirical Measure of Discount
Barber (1996) investigated the discount size using cross-sectional data from sales
of 112 real estate LPs. He regressed the discount size, deﬁned as the percentage
difference between each partnership’s sale price and the general partner’s (or a
third party appraiser) appraised value of each unit, on several partnership
performance characteristics. He documents a mean discount of 45% and after
including partnership-speciﬁc variables to account for cash ﬂow yield, leverage,
operating performance and liquidity, his regression model explained 80% of the
cross-sectional variation.
The empirical model in this study differs from Barber’s (1996) in several ways.
Although the same variables are used to control for partnership characteristics, the
empirical focus attempts to determine a pattern of discounts when multiple units
from the same LP’s are sold over time. In addition to the panel nature of the
database, the data also differs from Barber in that partnership transactions data
was obtained from Liquidity Fund (LF), which records actual trades made over
time. The panel database includes information on the number of transactions, the
number of partnership units traded in each transaction and the date of each
transaction and the price LF paid for each unit. Also made available was LF’s
internal valuation of each partnership’s break-up value, a potentially more reliable
estimate of the underlying asset value as compared to Barber’s database where
the general partner’s estimates were used.
Summary statistics are reported in Exhibit 1. The sample contains 3,265
transactions involving the purchase of 66,952 units. The average time span
between the ﬁrst and last purchase was 6.6 years. To see how the discounts may
change over time, the ﬁrst and last percentage discounts (Columns 3 and 5) are
averages of the ﬁrst and last ﬁve transactions respectively. Discounts are deﬁned
as the percentage of the purchase price to LF’s valuation price. The discounts















Exhibit 1  Descriptive Statistics





Name Date Discount Date Discount
Insured Income Properties 1982 1/10/86 29.9 8/3/93 16.8 7.6 4,710 160 13.1
Insured Income Properties 1983 10/2/86 18.0 5/7/93 18.3 6.6 6,792 199 0.4
Insured Income Properties 1984 3/18/88 13.0 7/20/93 17.6 5.3 6,022 226 4.6
Insured Income Properties 1985 2/18/88 19.1 11/1/93 15.4 5.7 11,309 375 3.7
JMB Income Properties, Ltd. 10 7/13/87 16.0 5/9/94 65.4 6.8 3,945 281 49.4
JMB Income Properties, Ltd. 11 8/18/87 5.4 10/20/93 62.2 6.2 3,223 223 56.7
JMB Income Properties, Ltd. 12 7/1/87 14.2 9/22/93 54.4 6.2 3,706 263 40.2
JMB Income Properties, Ltd. 13 9/14/88 20.8 3/7/95 48.0 6.5 2,472 117 27.3
JMB Income Properties, Ltd. 9 3/26/85 24.2 11/10/92 52.2 7.6 1,435 124 28.0
MLH Income Realty Partnership 4 2/24/89 37.5 4/29/94 36.3 5.2 2,533 102 1.2
MLH Income Realty Partnership 5 7/13/89 19.8 1/27/94 22.3 4.5 2,155 123 2.5
McNeil Real Estate Fund 10 6/1/83 26.3 11/8/90 73.1 7.4 3,543 186 46.8
McNeil Real Estate Fund 11 1/19/84 35.7 11/22/88 58.1 4.8 2,219 136 22.4
National Property Investors 6 4/15/86 25.1 12/9/91 48.6 5.7 3,903 149 23.5
Nooney Income Fund Ltd. 11 6/25/84 31.0 10/9/90 46.7 6.3 1,149 99 15.8
Public Storage Properties 7 1/16/85 9.8 3/7/91 25.1 6.1 1,816 86 15.3
Shelter Prop. I LP 4/4/85 24.5 5/13/93 50.0 8.1 1,177 104 25.5
Shelter Prop. II LP 4/11/85 23.5 7/6/94 51.8 9.2 1,320 99 28.3
Shelter Prop. IV LP 3/4/86 27.9 2/1/94 52.5 7.9 1,837 103 24.6
Shelter Prop 5 12/12/85 34.7 6/16/94 51.1 8.5 1,686 110 16.4
Average 22.8 43.3 6.6 20.5
Sum 66,952 3,265
Notes: The discounts are averages of the ﬁrst and last ﬁve transactions from the ﬁrst and last transactions date respectively.
aSpan is in years.Pricing Limited Partnerships  227
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Exhibit 2  Discount Distribution
ﬁnal average discount of 43.3%. The overall average discount was 35%. The
discount ﬁgures are determined by when they are measured. The sample of sales
in later transactions is consistent with Barber’s (1996) sample. The distribution of
discounts is provided in Exhibit 2.
The tabulated discounts in Exhibit 1 can be a misleading indicator of its time-
series characteristics in the absence of controlling for speciﬁc partnership
attributes. The increase in discounts may merely reﬂect the changing nature of the
partnership due to changes in earnings, leverage or the performance of the
underlying assets. To control for such effects, factors are incorporated into the
model that Barber (1996) found to be signiﬁcant. The factors include: (1) each
partnership’s yield; (2) each partnership’s leverage; (3) its operating performance
as measure by earnings and revenues; (4) a measure unrealized capital gains; and
(5) a measure of liquidity.11
The same data source as Barber (1996), the publication Partnership Proﬁles,w a s
used to construct the same explanatory variables for the years 1989 to 1993. The
yield is the annualized rate of cash distribution for each partnership. Leverage is
the ratio of each partnership’s secured debt outstanding as a percentage of the
partnership’s property at cost. Operating performance, a measure of the underlying
property’s ability to generate revenue, is measured by two variables. The ﬁrst is228  Quan and Xuan
Exhibit 3  OLS Pooled Results
Dependent
Variable Discount Log Discount
Log Unit
Price
Intercept 50.272 4.185 0.715


























No. of trades 0.004 0.0004 0.001
(0.07) (1.81) (1.26)
Years since offering 1.231 0.013 0.023
(10.66) (2.61) (10.23)
Adj. R2 .6050 .5532 .8263
Note: N  2,424.
gross revenue expressed as a percentage of property at cost, and the second, a
measure of earnings, is the ratio of operating surplus over property at cost.
Liquidity is measured by the number of partnership units sold. Barber’s unrealized
capital gains variable was not constructed as his measure requires the general
partner’s estimate of asset value. The measure used to test for the time varying
properties of the discount was the date of each transaction since the date of closing
of each partnership’s initial offering. Because data from Partnership Proﬁles for
1989 to 1993 was required, the ﬁnal sample of 2,424 transactions involved the
sale of 52,679 limited partnership units from eighteen partnerships.
As in Barber (1996), three variants of the model were estimated. Model 1 uses
discounts as the dependent variable; Model 2 uses logged discounts; and Model
3 regresses logged prices on the log of the unit valuations. The OLS pooled results
are reported in Exhibit 3.
In all cases, the models ﬁt the data reasonably well, and the estimates were
consistent with Barber’s (1996) estimates. As in Barber, the models achieved the
best ﬁt, explaining 82% of the total variation. The coefﬁcient on the years since
offering variable captures systematic discount changes due to the timing of these
purchases. It can be seen in Model 1 that even controlling for performance factors,Pricing Limited Partnerships  229
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there is a strong and signiﬁcant positive time of transaction effect. The results
suggest that, on average, the discount rate increased by 1.23% per year. As a test
for nonlinearity, a (years since offering)2 term was introduced causing the R2 of
the model to improve to .61 and the coefﬁcients (t-Stats) for both terms to change
to 2.76 (3.68) for the year term and 0.29 (5.38) for the square year term
respectively. Since both are highly signiﬁcant, there is strong evidence of a time
varying decreasing pattern for discounts, as indicated in the model. As another
indication of this effect, the logged prices were regressed on the performance
variables and on the years since offering variable. The previous ﬁnding of an
increasing discount rate corresponds to a negative coefﬁcient on the year variable
when the dependent variable is expressed in prices. A rising discount implies that
lower prices are paid for each unit over time. This was conﬁrmed in the results
since the years variable had the negative sign and was strongly signiﬁcant,
achieving a t-Stat of 10.33.
 Conclusion
In this study, a model was developed of the sellers’ price setting decisions and
the buyer’s reaction to the sellers’ actions. When future sales are possible, sellers
would be more aggressive in setting their asking price since not selling in an
earlier round does not preclude future sales. However, as the buyer buys more
units, there is a possibility of future sales and this may lead to lower prices. This
‘‘later sale’’ effect may result in price decreases as the buyer approaches the limit
of unit purchases. This is contrary to the usual intuition that the buyer’s ability to
purchase sequentially will result in price discrimination whereby units are
purchased in earlier rounds at lower prices from those sellers who are most eager
to sell. Thus, under price discrimination, prices would increase over time as the
number of units is sold. If the later sale effect is strong, a pattern of decreasing
prices may be seen. Using a transactions level database, the ﬁndings show that
there is indeed a decreasing price effect. Although this surely does not constitute
a test of the model, it does offer some insight as to factors that may inﬂuence the
secondary market prices of limited partnerships.
 Appendix
The seller’s expected proﬁt function given that the buyer has announced that he
will only buy one unit is:230  Quan and Xuan
E[P  vk  1]
q n1   (P  v)[1  F(xv)] (vx)dv
q  p(1  q)
p(1  q) n1   (P  v)[1  F(xv)] (vx)dv  q  p(1  q)
n1 n1  (P  v)[1  (1  F(xv) )][1  F(xv)] (vx)dv}.
(a1)
Deﬁning t  p(1  q)/q and multiplying both sides of the above expression by
[q  p(1  q)]/q, Equation (a1) can be expressed as:
E[P  vk  1]
n1  (P  v)[1  F(xv)] (vx)dv
n1  t  (P  v)[1  F(xv)] (vx)dv 
n1 n1  (P  v)[1  (1  F(xv) )][1  F(xv)] (vx)dv . 
(a2)
The corresponding ﬁrst order condition when maximized with respect to P is:
n1 (1  t) [1  F(xv)] (vx)dv
ƒ(xv) n2  (1  t)(n  1)(P  v)x[1  F(xv)] (vx)dv
P(x)
n1 n2  t [1  F(xv)) ][1  F(xv)] (vx)dv
ƒ(xv) n2 n2  t (P  v)(n  1)[1  F(xv)] [1  F(xv)] (vx)dv
P(x)
ƒ(xv) n1 n3  t (P  v)(n  2)[1  (1  F(xv)) ][1  F(xv)] (vx)dv  0.
P(x)
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Collecting terms and rearranging this expression produces:
(1  t)(n  1) (P  v)[1  F(xv)] ƒ(xv)
n2
(vx)dv  t(n  1) (P  v)[1  F(xv)] ƒ(xv)
2n4
(vx)dv 
t(n  2) (P  v)[1  (1  F(xv)) [1  F(xv)] ƒ(xv)(vx)dv
n1 n3 ]
P(x)  .
(1  t) [1  F(xv)] (vx)dv  t [1  (1  (1 

n 1
F(xv)) ][1  F(xv)] (vx)dv
n1 n2 (a4)
Applying the assumptions that the priors are diffuse and that the estimation errors
are independent of v, the above expression simpliﬁes to:
(1  t)(n  1)
P  x n22   z [1  F(z)] (z) dz  
 t(n  1)
P  x 2n42   z [1  F(z)] ƒ(z) dz  
 t(n  2) [1  F
P  x n1 n32   z [1  (1  F(z)) ] (z)] ƒ(z) dz  
P(x)  .
(1  t) [1  F(z)]
n1 n1 ƒ(z)dz  t [1  (1  F(z)) ]
[1  F(z)]
n2 ƒ(z)dz (a5)
where and z  (x  v)/ and  is the standard deviation of the random signal x.
The denominator of Equation (a5) is [1  t]/n  t/2(n  1). Inverting Equation
(a5) the above expression yields the desired equilibrium relationship as expressed
in Equations (13)–(15).
 Endnotes
1 In another study, Barber (1996) documents an average discount of 45%.
2 A good source for understanding this secondary market is Wollack and Donaldson
(1992).
3 The assumption of risk neutrality is a strong one. Termed the ‘‘declining price anomaly’’
or the ‘‘afternoon effect,’’ it is well known that risk aversion will result in declining
prices in multiple-object auctions (McAfee and Vincent, 1993). Our risk neutrality
assumption allows us to focus on repeated game effects of sellers.232  Quan and Xuan
4 Note that even if the buyer agrees to announce the details of prior sales, such information
is not credible since the buyer would have an incentive to distort such information to
inﬂuence future selling prices.
5 For tractability reasons, the case when each limited partner holds more than one unit
each was not considered.
6 Only pricing equilibriums where the price is an increasing function of the signals were
considered.
7 This assumption implies that the buyers’ resale market is efﬁcient and the LP’s true
common values are revealed. This appears reasonable since investors in seasoned
partnership funds participate frequently and are often informed about the historical
payoff of each partnership which comprise the fund.
8 See Levin and Smith (1991) or Wilson (1990).
9 It is important to note that we do not derive the equilibrium value for p, the probability
that the buyer does not disclose the total number of units he plans to buy. However, the
result on the pattern of discounts still holds if p is interpreted as the sellers’ probability
of a later round sale. In this case, p can come about from exogenous demand
considerations. This interpretation for p conforms with LF’s practices since they
routinely make repeated purchases over time, presumably in response to changing market
demand for the units.
10 This not a restrictive assumption for ‘‘reasonable’’ parameter values. For example, if
p  2/3 and q  1/3, n  6 is required or that there are at least six limited partners.
11 Since these factors are used to control for partnership speciﬁc factors and are not the
main focus of the study, interested readers are referred to Barber (1996) for his
justiﬁcation to include these factors.
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